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Researchers conducting non-experimental studies of panel data often attempt to remove the 
potentially biasing effects of individual heterogeneity through the inclusion of fixed effects.  I 
evaluate so-called ￿Value Added Models￿ (VAMs) that attempt to identify teachers￿ effects on 
student achievement.  I develop falsification tests based on the assumption that teachers in later 
grades cannot have causal effects on students￿ test scores in earlier grades.  A simple VAM like those 
used in the literature fails this test:  5
th grade teachers have nearly as large effects on 4
th grade gains as 
on 5
th grade gains.  This is direct evidence of non-random assignment.  I use a correlated random 
effects model to generalize the test to more complex estimators that allow for tracking on the basis 
of students￿ permanent ability.  The identifying restrictions of these estimators are again rejected.  
Teacher assignments evidently respond dynamically to year-to-year fluctuations in students￿ 
achievement.  I propose models of this process that permit identification.  Estimated teacher effects 
are quite sensitive to model specification; estimators that are consistent in the presence of (some 
forms of) dynamic tracking yield very different assessments of teacher quality than those obtained 
from common VAMs.  VAMs need further development and validation before they can support 
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I.  Introduction 
Experiments are in short supply, but the demand for causal estimates is large.  Non-
experimental methods can identify causal effects, if their maintained assumptions about the 
assignment to treatment and the processes governing outcomes are correct.  Some data structures 
allow tests of these assumptions, permitting an assessment of the validity of the treatment effect 
estimates (Ashenfelter and Card, 1985; Heckman, Hotz and Dabos, 1987). 
A common approach to non-experimental inference is to condition on individual fixed 
effects.  Advances in computing have made ever more complex models tractable.  Models that 
decompose the variation in wages into worker and firm components, for example, have spawned a 
burgeoning literature on the determinants of firm wage effects.
1  Quite similar specifications have 
been used to distinguish the effects of student ability and teacher quality on students￿ test scores.  
On the basis of this sort of model, a consensus has formed that teacher quality is an extremely 
important determinant of student achievement, and that an important goal of educational policy 
should be the creation of incentives to attract, retain, and motivate high-quality teachers.
2 
Each teacher and each firm constitutes a distinct treatment and the effects of teachers and 
firms participating in any experiment
3 would therefore be uninformative about the effects of non-
participants.  An important advantage of non-experimental estimators is that they can be used to 
measure effects for the entire population.  So-called ￿growth models￿ are increasingly important 
components of school accountability policy, and several states have incorporated econometric 
models for teacher quality into their teacher accountability programs.  Some analysts (e.g., Gordon, 
et al., 2006) have gone so far as to suggest that schools be encouraged to fire as many as one quarter 
of new teachers who are found to make inadequate contributions to student learning.   
                                                 
1 Abowd and Kramarz (1999) provide a somewhat outdated review.   See also Abowd et al. (1999). 
2 See, e.g., Gordon et al. (2006), Hanushek (2002), Hanushek and Rivkin (2006), Koppich (2005), and Peterson (2006). 
3 Dee and Keys (2004) and Nye et al. (2004) use the Tennessee STAR experiment to study teachers￿ value added.     
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These applications require causal estimates.  Workers and students are not randomly 
assigned to firms and teachers.  The inclusion of controls for individual heterogeneity may permit 
causal identification, but only under rarely-specified assumptions for which there is little evidence.
  
This paper investigates the estimation of teachers￿ causal effects on student achievement 
through so-called ￿Value Added Models,￿ or VAMs, applied to non-experimental data.
4  The focus 
on education is dictated by data availability; the theoretical analysis applies equally to other 
applications, in particular the analogous models for firm effects on worker wages, though of course 
the empirical results might not.  I enumerate the identifying assumptions of the commonly-used 
VAMs and construct tests of these assumptions.   
The most important assumption made in value added modeling concerns the assignment of 
students to teachers.  Most VAMs assume that teacher assignments are uncorrelated with other 
determinants of student learning.  (The most widely used VAM, the Tennessee Value Added 
Assessment System, or TVAAS, assumes that there is no heterogeneity in student growth rates.
5)  
This is unlikely.  In most schools, there is some degree of non-random assignment, either via formal 
￿ability tracking￿ or informally, at the principal￿s discretion subject to the influence of parental 
requests.  If the information used to form these assignments is predictive of future achievement 
growth, simple VAMs will not yield causal estimates.  
My tests are based on a simple falsification exercise:  Future treatments cannot have causal 
effects on current outcomes, and models that indicate such effects must be misspecified.
6  I 
                                                 
4 Recent examinations of value added modeling include Ballou (2002), Braun (2005a, b), Harris and Sass (2006), 
McCaffrey et al. (2003), and a symposium in the Journal of Educational and Behavioral Statistics (Wainer, 2004).  Clotfelter, 
Ladd, and Vigdor (2006) highlight the importance of non-random teacher assignments for value added analysis, the 
focus of the current study, but conclude that this is a relatively minor issue in North Carolina. 
5 See Ballou et al. (2004); Bock et al. (1996); Sanders and Horn (1994, 1998); Sanders and Rivers (1996); and Sanders et 
al. (1997).  The TVAAS model allows error terms to be correlated across grades.  But these error terms are in 
achievement level equations; in fact, TVAAS does not allow for observed or unobserved heterogeneity in growth rates.   
6 This is directly analogous to the strategy used by Heckman et al. (1987)  to evaluate non-experimental estimators of the 
effect of job training on workers￿ wages.  Heckman et al. argue that estimators which fail to eliminate differences in pre-    
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demonstrate that a simple VAM of the form typically used in the literature indicates large effects of 
current teachers on past achievement:  A student￿s 5
th grade teacher has nearly as large an ￿effect￿ 
on her 4
th grade achievement growth as on her learning during 5
th grade.  This is direct evidence of 
non-random assignment.   
Richer VAMs may be able to identify causal effects in the presence of sorting, but the 
appropriate model depends on the type of sorting used.  It is useful to distinguish between two 
types:  That based solely on students￿ permanent characteristics (e.g., IQ), and that based in part on 
the time-varying component of student performance.  I refer to the former as ￿static tracking￿ ￿ 
even if it is less formal and complete than an announced ability tracking policy ￿ and the latter as 
￿dynamic￿ tracking.  If students entering a school are assigned permanently into advanced or 
remedial tracks, tracking is static.  If students can be re-assigned after entrance when annual test 
scores indicate that the initial assignment was incorrect, however, the tracking is dynamic. 
Some value added analyses have used enriched VAMs that absorb differences in student 
ability across classrooms via the inclusion of student fixed effects.  These can identify teachers￿ 
causal effects in the presence of static tracking.  If there is dynamic tracking, however, the available 
estimators are inconsistent for teachers￿ causal effects.
7   
The interpretation of student fixed effects VAMs thus depends crucially on the form of 
tracking that is used.  To evaluate the static tracking assumption, I embed my falsification exercise in 
Chamberlain￿s (1982, 1984) correlated random effects model.  Static tracking implies that estimators 
which fail to account for student heterogeneity will yield the same apparent effect of future teachers 
                                                                                                                                                             
training wages between the treatment and comparison groups must be relying on incorrect assumptions about the wage 
process or about the assignment of workers to training. 
7 A similar result applies to the separation of worker and firm heterogeneity in wages:  Firm effects are identified by fixed 
effects regressions if worker-firm matches depend only on permanent worker characteristics, but not if mobility is 
related to the short-term innovation in a worker￿s productivity.  I discuss below the infeasibility of estimators for models 
with dynamic assignment (Arellano, 2001) in the teacher or firm effects contexts.     
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in all grades, as each reflects the omitted student effect.  That is, grade-6 teachers should appear to 
have similar effects on grade-4 and grade-5 scores.  The data definitively reject this restriction. 
I close by considering models of dynamic tracking that would permit the estimation of 
teachers￿ causal effects.  I describe two sets of assumptions about the educational production 
function and about the teacher assignment process, appropriate for different settings, that permit 
identification.  I present estimates using approximations to the implied estimators that are feasible 
given the available data.  These indicate that tracking leads to important biases in teachers￿ estimated 
effects, as estimates that account for (a restricted type of) tracking are not very highly correlated with 
those from simpler VAMs.  They also point to a second important, often overlooked factor:  
Students￿ past teachers appear to have continuing effects on their gains as they progress through 
school.  Effects in the second year after contact (e.g., of the 4
th grade teacher on the 5
th grade gain) 
are negatively correlated (ρ = -0.5) with effects in the first year, and the first year effects are poor 
proxies (ρ = 0.5) for teachers￿ cumulative contributions.  Correct models of tracking and of 
educational production are essential for the causal interpretation of value added estimates.   
II.  The Education Production Function and Value Added Modeling
8 
A.  Educational Production 
A student￿s achievement depends on the cumulative impact of inputs received to date from a 
variety of sources ￿ family, school, peers, community, etc. ￿ as well as on the student￿s permanent 
ability.  School-based inputs are my focus here.  A general educational production function is: 
(1)  Aig = fg (Si(g), μi, εi(g)), 
where Aig is the achievement score of student i in grade g, Si(g) contains the full history of school-
based inputs from birth through grade g, μi is contains all non-school inputs (both family and 
                                                 
8 I draw in this section on Harris and Sass (2006) and Todd and Wolpin (2003).     
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individual) that do not vary over time, and εi(g) is a history of time-varying non-school inputs and 
random errors in each year.   
If fg( ) is linear, this yields an equation of the form 
(2)  Aig = Si1 β1
g + ￿ + Sig βg
g + μi τ
g + εi1 φ1
g + ￿ + εig φg
g, 
where Sih is a vector of school-based inputs in grade h, βh
g (h ≤ g) is the effect of grade-h school 
inputs on grade-g achievement, εih and φh
g are the corresponding variables and coefficients for time-
varying non-school inputs, and τ
g is the effect of permanent characteristics.
9 
B.  Gain Scores 
The difference between (2) and the corresponding equation for achievement in grade g-1, 
(3)  Aig-1 = Si1 β1
g-1 + ￿ + Sig-1 βg-1
g-1 + μi τ
g-1 + εi1 φ1
g-1 + ￿ + εig-1 φg-1
g-1,  
characterizes the ￿gain score,￿ the change in achievement between grade g-1 and grade g: 
(4)  ∆Aig ≡ Aig ￿ Aig-1 = Si1 (β1
g ￿ β1
g-1) + ￿ + Sig-1 (βg-1
g ￿ βg-1
g 




g-1) + εi1 (φ1
g ￿ φ1
g-1) + ￿ + εig-1 (φg-1
g ￿ φg-1
g-1) + εig φg
g.  
μi enters into (4) only to the extent that it has different effects on achievement in grades g-1 and g.  
A focus on gains can therefore be seen as removing a student fixed effect in achievement.  Of 
course, if ability has different effects in different grades, it cannot be treated as a fixed effect and is 
not removed by differencing.   
C.  Decay 
In general, the grade-g gain depends on the full history of school and time-varying non-
school inputs.  With restrictions on the β coefficients, however, past inputs may disappear from the 
                                                 
9 Boardman and Murnane (1979), Rivkin et al. (2005) and Hanushek (1979) discuss the limitations of this sort of 
specification.  Todd and Wolpin (2003) emphasize that family inputs will respond, most likely in a compensatory 
fashion, to school inputs.  Note also that (2) rules out any complementarities between school and non-school inputs, or 
between inputs of the same type across grades.  I maintain this assumption throughout.     
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g for all h < g), then grade-g gains depend only on grade-g inputs: 
(5)  ∆Aig = Sig βg
g + μi (τ
g ￿ τ
g-1) + εig φg
g.
  






g for some 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1 
and all h < g), (4) can be re-arranged to express grade-g gains as a function of current inputs and the 
lagged achievement level: 
(6)  ∆Aig = Aig-1 (ξ ￿ 1) + Sig βg
g + μi (τ
g ￿ ξ τ
g-1) + εig φg
g.
10 
Both zero decay and constant decay are strong restrictions on the educational production 
process, and it is easy to imagine ways in which they might be violated.
11  For example, vocabulary 
drills might raise students￿ scores on the end-of-grade test without having much effect on their long-
run achievement, implying rapid decay.  The rate of decay may vary with teaching styles:  Compare a 
teacher who focuses on drills with one who is skilled at teaching her students to enjoy reading for 
pleasure.  The achievement effects of the latter are likely to decay slowly if at all, and indeed it may 
have larger effects on students￿ long-run scores than in the short term.  If so, the rate of decay may 
be faster for the ￿drills￿ treatment than for the ￿instill a taste for reading￿ treatment.  There is little 
basis for either the zero-decay or the constant-decay restrictions. 
The general model (4) imposes only one important restriction:  There is no effect of future 
inputs on current gains.  That is, neither Sih nor εih enter into the equation for ∆Aig, g < h.  This 
restriction arises naturally from the structure of the model, and forms the basis for my tests. 
                                                 
10 See Harris and Sass (2006).  If there is any measurement error in the annual test score, this will be a component of εig 
that decays fully in the next year.  Generalizing (6) to allow for this when other inputs do not decay so quickly introduces 
a correlation between Aig-1 and the error term, and some researchers (Koedel and Betts, 2007; Ladd and Walsh, 2002) 
instrument for Aig-1 with Aig-2. 
11 The decay of past inputs is closely related to the degree to which test scores in different grades measure the same 
things and use the same scale.  The no-decay and constant-decay properties are not invariant to re-scaling of test scores 
unless the same transformation is applied to each grade￿s scores.       
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D.  A Simple VAM 
It is difficult to measure and control for the full set of relevant schooling inputs, particularly 
as the sorts of inputs that are readily measured ￿ class sizes, teacher experience, school spending ￿ 
may be less important than the hard-to-capture efficiency with which these inputs are used 
(Hanushek, 1981, 1986).  A widely-used alternative, and the focus of the current analysis, is to 
include a full set of indicators for students￿ grade-g teachers in Sig.  There are typically no other 
classroom-level controls; a teacher￿s ￿effect￿ is defined to equal the effect of being in a particular 
classroom and incorporates both the teacher￿s quality and the total effects of all other classroom-
level determinants of performance (including, e.g., peers and class size). 
The simplest value added specification is a regression of grade-g gain scores on indicators 
for grade-g teachers, perhaps with controls for a few student characteristics: 
(7)  ∆Aig = Tig βg
g + Xi θ
g + eig. 
Here, Tig is an exhaustive set of teacher indicators and Xi is a vector of student characteristics.  My 
notation treats X as non-time-varying:  Most of the regressors that are typically available are constant 
across grades.
12  Equation (7), by excluding teachers from grades 1 through g-1, imposes the zero 
decay assumption discussed above
 , though this could be loosened by including past teacher 
assignments as additional explanatory variables.
13   
(7) attributes all school-level determinants of gain scores to teachers.  As an alternative, one 
can normalize the β coefficients to have mean zero within each school.  This avoids the need to 
model the assignment of students to schools, though because it prevents comparisons of teacher 
quality across schools it is unsuitable for most policy applications.  I focus throughout on within-
                                                 
12 Typical regressors are race, gender, and free lunch status.  Even the last varies little over time in practice. 
13 Some studies include the lagged achievement score as a control variable, either instrumented or not.  As noted above, 
this allows for decay of past inputs, but at a constant, uniform rate.     
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school variation in β.  Identification of this component is necessary but not sufficient for 
identification of the full β vector. 
Estimates of specifications much like equation (7) form the basis for most value added 
analyses.
14  Many authors model the coefficients on the teacher indicators as random effects, while 
others use fixed effects techniques.  The two types of models differ in their abilities to accommodate 
X variables:  Random effects models typically require that teacher quality be orthogonal to any 
included controls (Ballou, et al., 2004), while fixed effects models can accommodate a correlation 
between teacher quality and observed controls, at some cost in efficiency.  The two models rely on 
common assumptions about the relationship between teacher assignments and unobserved 
determinants of student achievement.  As these assumptions are the focus of my analysis, my results 
(primarily from fixed effects estimators) are equally applicable to both sorts of models.   
Value added analyses cannot identify teachers causal effects under any exogeneity 
assumptions if we maintain the conventional definition that sampling error must go to zero as the 
sample size grows toward infinity:  Realistic assumptions would allow the number of teachers to 
grow with the number of students, keeping the number of students per teacher ￿ the class size ￿ 
approximately fixed and ensuring that sampling errors remain non-trivial.  I focus on a weaker 
definition:  I refer to teacher effects as ￿identified￿ if they would be accurately estimated as the 
number of students in the sample went to infinity with the number of teachers fixed.  If teacher 
effects are identified under these unrealistic asymptotics, VAMs can be used in compensation and 
retention policy with appropriate correction for the sampling errors that arise with finite class sizes; 
if not, it is unreasonable to treat them as noisy but unbiased estimates of causal effects.   
                                                 
14 See, e.g., Aaronson et al. (2007) and Rockoff (2004).  The TVAAS model is expressed as a mixed model for level 
scores that depend on all lagged inputs, but the essential identification strategy is of this form.  Other studies include the 
lagged achievement score as a control variable.  See, e.g., Kane et al. (2006); Clotfelter et al. (2007); Goldhaber (2007); 
and Jacob and Lefgren (2005).  As noted above, this allows for input effects to decay at a constant rate.      
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Even under this definition, identification of the β coefficients ￿ or of summary statistics like 
the variance of β across teachers ￿ requires strong assumptions about teacher assignments.  
Specifically, Tig must be orthogonal to all other determinants of grade-g gains.  Even with zero decay 
of teachers￿ effects, any correlation between Tig and (μi - E[μi | Xi]) ￿ if τ
g ≠ τ
g-1 ￿ or εig  will 
introduce bias.  The first rules out static tracking, if permanent characteristics influence gain scores.  
The second puts strong restrictions on dynamic tracking.  We require at least contemporaneous 
exogeneity, E[Tig εig] = 0, and most likely something stronger:  Although in principle the grade-g 
teacher assignment could depend on the grade-h gain (h<g), this can be accommodated only if εig is 
uncorrelated with εih.  Without strong restrictions on the serial correlation of ε, teacher assignments 
must be independent of test scores (conditional on Xi) in each previous grade. 
E.  The Student Fixed Effects VAM 
Some studies adopt a richer specification that allows teacher assignments to depend on 
unobserved, permanent components of the error term, absorbing these components with student 
fixed effects in the gain equation (i.e. with student-specific trends in achievement).
15  The model is: 
(8)  ∆Aig = Tig βg
g + Di μ + eig, 
where Di is a set of indicators for each student and μ a set of student-specific coefficients.   This 
again relies on the assumption of zero decay.
16   
Estimation of (8) requires at least two observations on gain scores for each student.  To 
illustrate the identifying assumptions, suppose that we observe gain scores in grades 1 and 2: 
(9)  ∆Ai1 = Ti1 β1
1 + Ti1 β2
2 + Di μ + ei1 
(10)  ∆Ai2 = Ti1 β1
1 + Ti2 β2
2 + Di μ + ei2 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., Harris and Sass (2006), Koedel and Betts (2007); Jacob and Lefgren (2005); Rivkin et al. (2005); and Boyd et 
al. (2007). 
16 Even under the assumptions discussed in the text, strong assumptions about the decay process would be required to 
identify the effects of lagged teachers in an augmented version of (8) that allowed for decay.     
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The mean gain for student i is: 
(11)  Mi ≡ ‰ [∆Ai1 + ∆Ai2 ] = ‰ [Ti1 β1
1 + Ti2 β2
2] + Diμ + ‰(ei1 + ei2). 
The estimating equation subtracts the mean gain for student i from each year￿s gain score: 
(12)  ∆Aig ￿ Mi = ‰Tig βg
g ￿ ‰ Ti3-g β3-g
3-g + ‰ eig ￿ ‰ ei3-g, 
Demeaning eliminates the Di μ term.  But both grades￿ teacher assignments and the transitory error 
terms from both grades￿ gain equations enter into the equations for each grade￿s de-meaned gain.  
Whenever the number of grades, G, is small enough that G
-1 is non-negligible, as will be true in any 
imaginable value added analysis, a non-zero correlation between the error in one grade and the 
teacher assignment in that or any other grade will bias the estimated β coefficients.
  
The advantage of the student fixed effects model is that it is robust to correlations between 
teacher assignments and the permanent component of the test score error, μi, at least insofar as this 
component enters with the same loading into each grade￿s gain equation (that is, if τ
g ￿ τ
g-1 is 
constant across g).  But identification of the β coefficients requires strict exogeneity of teacher 
assignments conditional on μ:  There can be no correlation between the grade-g teacher assignment 
and the time-varying residual ε in any past or future grade.  This is stronger than the corresponding 
assumption for the simple VAM without decay, which even at its strongest required only that the 
grade-g teacher assignment be unrelated with past residuals.  It is easy to imagine how it might be 
violated:  It requires in effect that principals decide on classroom assignments for the remainder of a 
child￿s career on the day that the child begins kindergarten.  If instead teacher assignments are 
updated each year and depend on both the student￿s permanent ability and her performance during 
the previous year, strict exogeneity would be violated. 
A standard strategy in panel data analysis when strict exogeneity does not hold is to work 
with the first-differenced equation,  
(13)  ∆Ai2 ￿ ∆Ai1 = Ti2 β2
2 ￿ Ti1 β1
1 + ei2 ￿ ei1,     
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rather than the de-meaned equation, instrumenting for the explanatory variables with lagged values 
(Anderson and Hsiao, 1981; Arellano and Bond, 1991).
17  But note that here Tig and Tig-1 are each 
vectors of hundreds or thousands of teacher indicators, and lagged teacher assignments are unlikely 
to have much predictive power for them (and are invalid in any case if the zero decay assumption 
fails).  Thus, if teacher assignments may depend on student ability, there is no practical estimator 
that is robust to violations of strict exogeneity. 
F.  Testing the Identifying Assumptions 
Panel data on teacher assignments can be used to test for violations of the exogeneity 
assumptions that underlie the basic and student fixed effects VAMs.  An informal test of the basic 
VAM can be formed by examining the correlation between Tig and ∆Aig-1.  A non-zero correlation ￿ 
an apparent effect of grade-g teachers on gains in g-1 ￿ suggests that Tig is correlated with either μi 
or εig-1.
18  Coupled with evidence that the residual from the gain equation is serially correlated, this 
would strongly imply that T is endogenous in (7).
19   
The student fixed effects VAM can rationalize this result as the consequence of a correlation 
between μ and teacher assignments.  But an extension of the test can be used to evaluate the strict 
exogeneity assumption on which it relies.  With this assumption, any apparent effect of (for 
example) 6
th grade teachers on 4
th grade gains arises only because 6
th grade teacher assignments 
depend on and are correlated with μ.  Grade-6 teachers who are assigned high-μ students will appear 
to have positive effects and those with low-μ students will appear to have negative effects.  We 
should see the same pattern of apparent effects on grade-5 gains, positive for grade-6 teachers with 
                                                 
17 Equation (13) can be estimated by OLS without instrumentation (Koedel and Betts, 2007, implement a strategy like 
this) if the grade-g error term is uncorrelated with teacher assignments in grades g-1, g, and g+1.  This is slightly weaker 
(when G>2) than strict exogeneity.  It is difficult to imagine an assignment process that would satisfy this but would not 
satisfy strict exogeneity, however. 
18 A formal test would have to rule out the potential explanation that Tig is correlated with Tig-1 and that the omission of 
the latter drives the result.  This might be done by controlling for Tig-1 directly. 
19 I describe below a detailed, restrictive set of assumptions under which Tig might be correlated with Ai,g-1 without being 
correlated with the error term in (7).  But these would not hold in general.     
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high-μ students and negative for teachers with low-μ students.  An indication that a grade-6 teacher 
has different ￿effects￿ on grade-4 and grade-5 gain scores would indicate that not all of the omitted 
variables bias in (7) derives from μ, implying that the strict exogeneity assumption fails and that the 
student fixed effects VAM does not identify teachers￿ causal effects.  I develop this test ￿ a direct 
application of Chamberlain￿s (1982, 1984) correlated random effects model ￿ formally in Section V.  
III.  Data and Sample Construction 
My empirical analysis uses administrative data on public school students in North Carolina.  
North Carolina has been a leader in the development of linked longitudinal data on student 
achievement, and in 2006 was one of the first two states approved by the U.S. Department of 
Education to use ￿growth-based￿ accountability models.  The data, assembled and distributed by the 
North Carolina Education Research Data Center (NCERDC), have undergone extensive cleaning to 
ensure accurate matches between the component administrative data systems.  They have been used 
for several previous value added analyses (see, e.g., Clotfelter, et al., 2006; Goldhaber, 2007).   
The dataset contains scores from end-of-grade tests in math and reading in grades 3 through 
8.  I focus on reading scores; analyses for math scores are available upon request.  The tests purport 
to use a so-called ￿interval￿ scale, so that a one point increment corresponds to an equal amount of 
learning at each grade and at each point in the within-grade distribution.
20  I standardize the scale 
scores so that the distribution of 3
rd grade scores has mean zero and standard deviation one.  This 
preserves the interval scale.   
The importance of interval scales to value added modeling is not widely appreciated.
21  As 
noted earlier, most VAMs rely on a zero-decay assumption:  A 3
rd grade teacher who raises her 
                                                 
20 The scale scores are linear transformations of the estimated θ parameters from a 3-parameter Item Response Theory 
model (Sanford, 1996, p. 20).   
21 But see Ballou (2002) and Yen (1986)  Many authors (see, e.g., Boyd, et al., 2007; Kramarz, Machin and Ouazad, 2007; 
Rivkin, et al., 2005) standardize scores separately in each grade.  This destroys any interval scale unless the variance of 
achievement is indeed constant across grades.     
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students￿ end-of-grade scores by 1 point also adds one point to their scores in all future grades. This 
restriction is not scale-invariant, and is particularly implausible if scores do not have the interval 
property.  The assumption that ability is equally important to each grade￿s gain is also sensitive to 
scaling.  Interval scaling makes these assumptions plausible, but does not guarantee them.  In the 
specifications below, I allow for both arbitrary, heterogeneous decay of teachers￿ effects and grade-
specific effects of ability, as in (4). I also explore alternative scalings. 
A.  Empirical Properties of Gain Scores 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for reading test scores and gains, computed over all 
available observations on students who were in 3
rd grade in 1999, 4
th grade in 2000, 5
th grade in 2001, 
or 6
th grade in 2002.   
The table indicates that test scores are correlated about 0.82 in adjacent grades.  A 1996 
report estimates that the North Carolina reading score￿s test-retest reliability ￿ based on 
administrations of alternative forms of the test one week apart ￿ is 0.86 (Sanford, 1996, p. 45), 
indicating that 14% of the variance of test scores is transitory noise.  This places an upward bound 
on the year-to-year correlations, one that is nearly met.  Because gain scores retain all of the noise 
from the two component tests but eliminate much of the signal, they are necessarily less reliable, 
particularly when the signal is highly correlated over time.  A simple calculation indicates that the 
correlation in true achievement between adjacent years is 0.93 and that individual gain scores have 
reliability around 0.3.
22 
The lower right portion of Table 1 shows the correlation between gains in different grades.  
The correlation between the grade-4 gain (the change in scores between grade 3 and grade 4) and the 
                                                 
22 This and the following calculations are derived in an Appendix, and assume that the variance of achievement is 
constant across grades.  Stake (1971) presents a nearly identical calculation; see also Kane and Staiger (2001, 2002).  
Rogosa  (1995) argues that reliability is higher if gains are uncorrelated with initial levels, but Table 1 indicates that this is 
not the case here.       
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grade-5 gain is -0.43.  Noise in the grade 4 score enters positively into the grade-4 gain and 
negatively into the grade-5 gain, biasing the observed correlation downward relative to the 
correlation in true gains.  Based on gain score reliability of 0.3, the observed correlation is consistent 
with a correlation in true gains of -0.27.  A similar calculation indicates that the correlation between 
true grade-5 and grade-6 gains is -0.23.   
Finally, the correlation between observed grade-4 and grade-6 gains is 0.01.  Though small, 
this is significantly different from zero.  Using a reliability of 0.3, the observed correlation indicates a 
correlation between true gains of 0.03. 
These calculations have two implications for value added modeling.  First, gain scores are 
exceptionally noisy.  It will be difficult to pick out effects on true gains with any reliability (Ballou, 
2002), and mean reversion is likely to be an important factor.  Second, the weak correlation between 
grade-4 and grade-6 gains suggests that there is little permanent heterogeneity across students in the 
rate of gain ￿ either var(μ) is small or τ is nearly constant across grades.   
B.  Samples 
The North Carolina data do not contain explicit teacher identifiers, but they do identify the 
teacher (or other school staff member) who administered the end-of-grade tests.  In the elementary 
grades, this was usually the regular teacher.  I follow Clotfelter et al. (2006) in using a linked 
personnel database to identify test administrators who had regular teaching assignments.  I count a 
test administrator as a valid teacher if she taught a ￿self-contained￿ (i.e. all day, all subject) class for 
the relevant grade in the relevant year, if that class was not coded as Special Education or Honors, 
and if at least half of the tests that she administered were to students in the correct grade.  73% of 
5
th grade tests were administered by ￿valid￿ teachers. 
In North Carolina, 6
th grade students are typically in middle school and have different 
teachers for each subject.  The end-of-grade exam need not be taken in the relevant subject-matter     
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classroom, and students may not move together across classes.  I do not attempt to identify ￿valid￿ 
6
th grade teachers, nor do I attempt to estimate any grade-6 teacher￿s causal effect.  Instead, I use 6
th 
grade class assignments as a source of information about student sorting, on the assumption that 
students who take the exam together share at least one class.  I use the relationship between earlier 
achievement and grade-6 classroom assignments to identify the form that tracking takes.  Classes are 
likely more heavily tracked in 6
th grade than in earlier grades, so class groupings may proxy for 
unobserved student ability even better than do those in earlier grades.  
I work with two samples.  The first consists of 65,582 students from 860 schools who were 
in 5
th grade in 2000-2001 and who could be matched with valid teachers in that year.  I exclude 
students whose longitudinal records provide inconsistent measures of race or gender or multiple 
observations in any year, as these might indicate mismatches.  I also exclude those whose teachers 
have fewer than 12 sample students or whose schools have fewer than two included teachers.   
The second sample is more homogenous.  To simplify the correlated random effects 
analysis, I use only students who were in 3
rd grade in 1998-1999 and who progressed at the normal 
rate through 6
th grade in 2001-2002, without skipped or repeated grades or missing test scores in any 
year.  I exclude students who changed schools in 4
th or 5
th grade as well as those whose 4
th or 5
th 
grade teachers are invalid according to the definition outlined above.  I do not require that the 3
rd or 
6
th grade test administrator be a valid teacher, though I do track the identity of each, and I treat the 
group with which each student took the exam as a reasonably accurate proxy for the degree of 
across-classroom sorting.
23  I exclude schools with only a single teacher in the sample from any of 
grades 3, 4, 5, and 6.
24  The final sample consists of 21,101 students.  There are 457 schools, 1,760 
                                                 
23 The median school in my sample has 4 5th grade teachers but sees its students dispersed across 9 6th grade teachers.  
To avoid estimating effects from very small samples, I re-assign 6th grade teachers who had very small shares of the 
sample to a composite ID. 
24 Schools here are those that the students attend in grades 3-5. I also exclude a few students to eliminate perfect 
collinearity between teacher identifiers (as when an entire 4th grade class transitions to the same 5th grade teacher).       
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4
th grade teachers, and 1,764 5
th grade teachers represented.  Students are grouped into 2,005 and 
1,641 test administration groups in 3
rd and 6
th grade, respectively.   
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the two samples and for the population, the latter 
including all available observations for each variable.  The more homogenous samples, which will 
tend to exclude students who move frequently, have higher average achievement levels but similar 
patterns of gain scores.  The Data Appendix describes each sample in more detail. 
IV.  Preliminary Estimates 
Before implementing my formal tests, I present preliminary models that illustrate VAM 
estimation and suggest the importance of considering the dynamic path of educational production 
and teacher assignments.  I focus on a very simple value added model with teacher effects but no 
other controls, fit to the first, broader sample: 
(14)  ∆Ai5  =  Ti5 β5
5  +  ei5. 
Model (14) has R
2 = 0.098 and adjusted R
2 = 0.050.  By comparison, a model that includes only 
school effects has R
2 = 0.048 and 
2 R  = 0.034.   
The 3,013 β5
5 coefficients can be summarized by their standard deviation across teachers, 
after normalizing them to have mean zero within each school.
25  This is 0.145, indicating that a 
student whose teacher is one standard deviation (of achievement levels) above average will see her 
achievement improve relative to the average by one seventh of a standard deviation over the course 
of the year.  This corresponds to over one quarter of a standard deviation in the gain score 
distribution, and is similar to what has been found in other studies (e.g., Aaronson, et al., 2007; 
Kane, et al., 2006; Rivkin, et al., 2005). 
                                                 
25 Both the mean and the standard deviation are weighted by the number of students taught by each teacher.  The 
standard deviation is adjusted for the degrees of freedom absorbed by the normalization.     
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This overstates the standard deviation of true teacher effects, as it also incorporates a 











5 is the effect of teacher j and β ￿
5j
5 is the 
corresponding estimate.  Thus, the variance of the true β coefficients ￿ the mean of (β5j
5)
2 across 
teachers ￿ can be computed as the difference between the observed variance and the average 
sampling variance.  I use a heteroskedasticity-robust estimator for this.  The implied standard 
deviation of teachers￿ ￿true￿ effects is 0.106.  This again resembles existing estimates.  
A robust Wald test rejects (with a p value below 0.0001) the hypothesis that there is no 
variation in the β coefficients within schools.  But this test obscures as much as it reveals, as there is 
a great deal of heterogeneity across schools in the apparent importance of teachers.  Under the null 
hypothesis that teachers don￿t matter, the p value for a test that all of the teachers from school k 
have identical coefficients will have a uniform distribution on [0, 1].  By contrast, if there are true 
differences across teachers at school k, the p value will come from a distribution that peaks at zero 
and has lower density at high values.  The rate at which the density declines depends on the test￿s 
power, and we may not be likely to reject the null hypothesis at small schools, but very high p values 
should be unlikely.  Figure 1 shows the histogram of school-level p values.  There is indeed a large 
spike at zero:  At about 120 of the 860 schools in the sample, the p value is less than 0.05; at another 
150 schools, the p value is between 0.05 and 0.2.  But beyond this point, the density remains fairly 
stable.  327 schools have p values above 0.5, with no fall-off at higher values.  The overall picture is 
of a mixture of a uniform distribution with one skewed toward zero.  Taking the 327 (38%) schools 
with p values above 0.5 as coming from the uniform distribution, the implication is that there are no 
differences among teachers at perhaps three quarters of schools.  The result that teachers matter 
appears to be driven by the remaining quarter of schools, where there are clear differences.  This is     
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not merely a reflection of low power:  Figure 1 also shows the histogram of p values at schools with 
5 or more teachers, where power should be greater.  This has the same pattern as the overall sample.   
A.  Counterfactual value added estimates 
As a first step toward evaluating the identifying assumptions discussed in Section II, I re-
estimate model (14), substituting gain scores in other grades as the dependent variable.  Table 3 
summarizes the results of this analysis.  Column 1 describes the model for grade-5 gains.  Columns 2 
and 3 describe models for grade-4 and grade-6 gains, respectively, and column 4 describes a model 
in which the dependent variable is the cumulative gain score from 3
rd to 6
th grade, Ai6 ￿ Ai3.  In each 
case, the explanatory variables are grade-5 teacher indicators.   
As grade-5 teachers likely have only small effects on grade-6 gains and can have no effects 
on grade-4 gains, we should not expect these specifications to have much explanatory power if 
teacher assignments are exogenous.  In fact, the R
2 statistics are comparable to those in the original 
specification, and the hypothesis that the teacher effects are all zero is rejected at any reasonable 
confidence level in all four models.  The bottom rows show the standard deviations of the estimated 
￿effects.￿  These are nearly as large when the dependent variable is the lagged or lead gain or the 
long-run cumulative gain as when it is the contemporaneous gain.  This casts doubt on the causal 
interpretation of simple value added models like (14). 
The upper portion of Table 4 presents correlations between the coefficients in the various 
models from Table 3.  The correlation between a teacher￿s estimated effect on 5
th and 4
th grade gains 
is -0.41.  The correlation between 5
th and 6
th grade effects is also strongly negative, -0.54.  By 
contrast, the correlation between a teacher￿s effects on 5
th grade gains and on cumulative gains 
across three years is positive but quite small, 0.12.
26 
                                                 
26 The cumulative effect is more strongly correlated with the effects on 4th and on 6th grade gains, even after correcting 
for sampling covariance deriving from the use of the same test scores in the cumulative and the 4th and 6th grade gains.     
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These correlations reflect the combination of true relationships and sampling error, which is 




th grade gains, for which the sampling error is strongly negatively correlated:  Any 
positive, non-persistent shock to, for example, students￿ 4
th grade scores will inflate β ￿
5j
4 ￿ the 
estimated effect on the 4
th grade gain ￿ and reduce β ￿
5j
5.  The lower portion of Table 4 presents 
sampling-adjusted estimates of the correlations of the true coefficients across specifications.
27  The 
adjustment has remarkably little effect, and the correlations between coefficients in models for 
adjacent grades￿ gains are still quite negative.  In other words, this simple VAM indicates that 
teachers who have positive effects on 5
th grade gains tend to have negative effects on 4
th and 6
th 
grade gains.  The correlation between the 5
th grade model and the cumulative model remains small. 
There are several candidate explanations for these results.  Begin with the negative 
correlation between β5j
6 and β5j
5, which we have established is not attributable to sampling error.  
This could be causal, if teachers who raise students￿ 5
th grade gains reduce their future potential 
(perhaps by teaching ￿cramming￿ skills with positive short-term but negative long-term returns).  It 
could also reflect bias from equation (14)￿s failure to account for static tracking, persistent student 
heterogeneity in the rate of achievement growth that is correlated with teacher assignments.  This 
explanation would suggest that the true variance of 5
th grade teachers￿ effects on 5
th grade gains is 
larger than is indicated by the basic VAM, as the better teachers are, on average, assigned students 
with flatter growth trajectories.  Finally, the result could reflect dynamic tracking:  If students are 
assigned to 5
th grade teachers on the basis of transitory shocks in 4
th grade, these could generate 
                                                 
27 I discussed earlier how to compute V(β5jh) from V(β ￿
5jh) and V(β ￿
5jh ￿ β5jh).  A similar formula applies to covariances.  
Assuming that sampling errors are uncorrelated with true coefficients, cov(β5jg, β5jh) = cov(β ￿
5jg, β ￿
5jh) - cov(β ￿
5jg ￿ β5jg, 
β ￿
5jh ￿ β5jh).  For computational simplicity, I restrict the sample for these calculations to students for whom both grade-g 
and grade-h gain scores are observed.  I allow for arbitrary clustering of errors for the same student across grades.     
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differences across 5
th grade teachers in growth paths in all future grades.  In this case, it is unclear 
how estimates of β5
5 from (14) relate to true causal effects. 
The sizable effects of 5
th grade teachers on 4
th grade scores rule out the causal explanation, as 
teachers can have no causal effects on their students￿ prior gains.  Students are evidently assigned to 
teachers in a way that correlates with past achievement gains.   
V.  The Full Lags and Leads Specification 
A.  Correlated Random Effects 
Chamberlain￿s (1982, 1984) correlated random effects model can be used to distinguish 
between static and dynamic tracking as explanations for the non-causal estimates in Table 3.  I 
develop the model in its general form, then describe its application in my data. 
Begin with the general gain score equation (4), using teacher indicators as the only observed 
explanatory variables.  This allows the grade-g gain to depend on individual ability and on the full 
history of teacher assignments and unobserved errors.  Simplifying notation slightly,
28 












h ih φ ~ ε τ ~ μ β ~ T .  
Now consider a linear projection of the permanent heterogeneity term, μi, onto the full sequence of 
teacher assignments in grades 1 through G.   
(16)  μi = Ti1 λ1 + ￿ + TiG λG + vi, 
with E[viTih] = 0 for h=1,￿,G.  If teacher assignments are independent of μ, all of the λ coefficients 
are identically zero; otherwise, some or all may be non-zero.  Substituting (16) into (15), we obtain 
(17)  ∆Aig =  () () ∑ ∑ ∑
= + = =
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h ih φ ~ ε γ v π T .  
Recall that the identifying assumption of the student fixed effects VAM is that teacher assignments 
are strictly exogenous conditional on μ, E[εih | Ti1, ￿, TiG] = 0 for each h.  If so, an OLS regression 
of grade-g gains onto teacher indicators in grades 1 through G identifies the πh
g coefficients.   
Equation (17) places strong restrictions on these coefficients.  If teacher assignments are 
uncorrelated with student ability (implying λh = 0) or if ability does not enter into the grade-g gain 
equation (
g τ ~  = τ
g ￿ τ
g-1
 = 0) then πh
g should be identically zero for all h>g.  Even if teacher 
assignments do depend on student ability, the restriction that πh
g must be a scalar multiple of λh in 
each grade h > g permits a specification test.  Specifically, if we observe gains in two grades, g and k, 
and teacher assignments in some later grade h>max(g,k), (17) implies that πh
g = λh 
g τ ~  and πh
k = λh 
k τ ~ .  Without loss of generality, we can normalize 
k τ ~ = 1.  We then have πh
g = πh
k * 
g τ ~ .  
Chamberlain proposes using optimal minimum distance (OMD; see also Abowd and Card, 1989) to 
identify the restricted coefficients and to form an overidentification test statistic.  A rejection of the 
restriction indicates that the strict exogeneity assumption for ε is incorrect. 
B.  Implementation 
As noted earlier, I work with a relatively homogenous sample of students who attend the 
same school in grades 3 through 5, never skip grades or are held back, and have complete data in 
grades 3, 4, 5, and 6.
29  I model both 4
th and 5
th grade gains, including as predictor variables 
indicators for the school that the student attended in grades 3-5 and indicators for the teachers that 




th grades:  
                                                 
29 It is not essential to the Chamberlain model that the full sequence of teacher assignments be observed.  The same 
strategy applies when μ is projected only onto teacher indicators in grades 3-6, so long as there are no effects of teachers 
before 3rd grade on the gain scores considered.     
  ￿ 22 ￿ 
(19)  ∆Ai4 = Ti3 π3
4 + Ti4 π4
4 + Ti5 π5
4 + Ti6 π6
4+ ei4. 
(20)  ∆Ai5 = Ti3 π3
5 + Ti4 π4
5 + Ti5 π5
5 + Ti6 π6
5+ ei5. 
Estimation of (19) and (20) presents computational difficulties, as each contains over six 
thousand dummy variables in five different sets.  The approach that I take is described in detail in 
the Appendix.  The homogeneity of my sample greatly reduces the computational burden:  Because 
I exclude students who change schools and include only covariates that are measured within 
schools,
30 (19) and (20) can be estimated via a sequence of within-school regressions, each including 
only the indicators for teachers at the school in question.  Each is estimated by system OLS, with 
standard errors that are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and within-student, across-grade serial 
correlation.  I then normalize the πh
g coefficients to have mean zero across all grade-h teachers at the 
same school.   
Recall from (17) that the πh
g coefficients for current and past teachers (h<g) include causal 
effects (
g
h β ~ ) as well as the student sorting parameters λh
g τ ~ , while the coefficients for future teachers 
include only the sorting parameters.  Intuitively, we might expect the former coefficients to be larger 
(in a variance sense) than are the latter.  Table 5 presents the unadjusted and adjusted standard 
deviations of the π coefficients from (19) and (20).  Diagonal elements ￿ π4
4 and π5
5 ￿ are shaded for 
emphasis.  We see that each of the πh
g coefficient vectors has substantial variation.  Standard 
deviations are larger for current and past teachers than for future teachers, but not by much.   
Table 6 presents goodness-of-fit statistics, for the full model and for restricted models that 
exclude one or more sets of teacher effects.  The first column shows the number of model degrees 
of freedom, including 457 school effects and all teacher effects that can be separately identified.  The 
second column shows the model R
2.  The model with just school effects explains 0.06 (0.05) of the 
                                                 
30 I allow a grade-6 teacher with students from several elementary schools to have separate ￿effects￿ on each group, in 
effect fully interacting Ti6 with elementary school indicators.  This allows tracking to depend on the base group ￿ a 
teacher might get the best students from a low-achieving school and the worst students from a high-achieving school.     
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variance of grade-4 (5) gains.  Adding indicators for the contemporaneous teacher raises this to 0.14 
(0.13).  Adding the remaining three sets of teacher indicators raises the R
2 to 0.33 in each grade. 
Columns 3 and 4 report heteroskedasticity-robust Wald tests of restricted models that leave 
out one or more sets of teachers.  These have χ
2 distributions under the null hypothesis.  Every 
restricted model is rejected at the 0.001 level.  Recall that if the strict exogeneity assumption holds, 
the coefficients for future teachers reflect only the degree to which students are sorted on the basis 
of their μ parameters.  Thus, if there is no tracking these coefficients should equal zero.  The clear 
rejection of this restriction, in the bottom row of each panel, indicates that there is indeed sorting.  
This rules out the basic VAM, as well as other specifications (including random effects models like 
that used in TVAAS) that rely on the same identifying assumptions.   
Columns 5-7 report three fit statistics that attempt to indicate whether the additional 
covariates included in richer models have enough explanatory power to justify their inclusion.  
Column 5 shows 
2 R .  With one exception (the exclusion of 6
th grade teachers from the model for 
4
th grade gains), 
2 R  is maximized in the most saturated model that includes all four sets of teacher 
indicators.  Columns 6 and 7 show the logs of the Akaike and Schwartz Information criteria, 
respectively.  These criteria penalize saturated models much more than does 
2 R , and in each case 
lower values correspond to better fit.  Both indicate that the saturated model is uniformly worse 
than any of the restricted models.  This is not particularly surprising, as the saturated model contains 
a large ratio of regressors (5,799) to observations (21,101).  However, its poor performance on these 
criteria does not offer support for the more traditional VAM specification:  Each criterion prefers 
the specification with only school effects to one including contemporaneous teacher effects as well. 
Table 7 presents the correlations between grade-h teachers￿ estimated effects on grade-4 and 
grade-5 gains, corr(πh
4, πh
5), weighted by the number of students exposed to each teacher.  To the 
extent that the λh coefficients ￿ the factor loading of individual ability μi on the grade-h teacher     
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assignment ￿ are an important part of the variation in πh
g, one would expect these correlations to be 
positive.  In fact, the correlation is around -0.5 for grade-4 teachers (and -0.6 when adjusted for 
sampling error) and only slightly less negative for teachers in other grades.   
To be sure, one can construct a story in which grade-4 teachers￿ causal effects on 4
th and 5
th 
grade gains are negatively correlated.  Perhaps some teachers achieve high gain scores by cramming 
and coaching for the test, enabling their students to do well on the end-of-grade test with little effect 
on future performance.  If indeed the grade-4 teacher can affect only Ai4 and not Ai5, the lagged 
effect 
5
4 β ~  should solely reflect mean reversion and should be perfectly negatively correlated with 
4
4 β ~ .  
Alternatively, if teachers￿ effects on grade-4 and grade-5 scores are uncorrelated and of equal 









3 β ~ , β ~ corr  might be negative. 
It is more difficult to account for the negative correlation between grade-6 teachers￿ 
apparent ￿effects￿ on 4
th and 5
th grade gain scores.  Indeed, this correlation indicates a rejection of 
strict exogeneity.  Recall that πh
g = ( )
k g τ ~ τ ~ πh
k (up to sampling error) for each g, k < h.  As 
k g τ ~ τ ~  
is a scalar, corr(π6
4, π6
5) should equal one (again, up to sampling error) if 
k g τ ~ τ ~  is positive and 
minus one if it is negative.   
I implement the formal test via optimal minimum distance (OMD), minimizing  
(21)  D ≡ ((π6
4  π6
5) - (
4 τ ~ λ6   




4 τ ~ λ6   
5 τ ~ λ6))￿ 
over the scalars 
4 τ ~  and 
5 τ ~  and vector λ6.
31  W is the cluster-robust variance matrix for (π6
4, π6
5).   
In the full sample, π6
g has 1,184 independent coefficients, yielding 1,183 degrees of freedom 
in D.
32  The first panel of Table 8 reports the (unweighted) standard deviations of the π coefficients 
                                                 
31 These are identified only up to a scale parameter:  Multiplying λ6 by any non-zero constant and dividing 
4 τ ~  and 
5 τ ~ by the same constant has no effect on D.  The composites 
g τ ~ λ6 and 
5 τ ~ /
4 τ ~  are uniquely identified, however.     
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for the effects of grade-6 teachers on 4
th and 5
th grade gains, both unadjusted and adjusted for 
sampling error.  The second panel reports the standard deviations of the fitted values from the 
restricted model, SD(γ4λ6) and SD(γ5λ6).  The restricted parameterization is unable to fit the OLS 
coefficients well, and the best fit is obtained by aligning closely with the unrestricted estimates for 
π6
5 (grade-6 teachers for grade-5 gains) and setting 
4 τ ~  to near zero.   
The next row shows the value of the objective, D, at the OMD estimates.  Under the null 
hypothesis of strict exogeneity, this is distributed χ
2 with 1,183 degrees of freedom.  This null is 
decisively rejected.  We can thus conclude that teacher assignments are not strictly exogenous, even 
conditional on a fixed individual effect.   
Given the importance of this result ￿ it implies that VAMs which absorb student 
heterogeneity through fixed effects are misspecified ￿ in Table 9 I explore its sensitivity to several 
alternative specifications.  The first row repeats the estimates from Table 8.  Row 2 uses scale scores 
that have been standardized separately in each grade.  Row 3 uses gain scores that are standardized 
separately for each initial level, to allow for the possibility that the test may exhibit mean reversion 
or other sensitivities to the location in the score scale.  Specifically, the dependent variable for the 
models summarized in this row is () ] A | V[A ] A | E[A - A 1 ig ig 1 ig ig ig − − .  Hanushek, et al. (2005) and 
Jacob and Lefgren (2007) use standardizations of this form.  Row 4 uses percentile scores in place of 
scale scores for all computations.  In each case, I reject the restriction that the grade-6 teacher 
effects on grade-4 and grade-5 gains are proportional. 
All of the above specifications exclude the score in year g-1 from the equation for the grade-
g gain score.  The last row of Table 9 presents a test based on a model that includes the once-lagged 
                                                                                                                                                             
32 The complete list of grade-6 teachers at each school is perfectly collinear, implying a singular W.  I drop the teacher at 
each school with the largest number of students, and use only the remaining π coefficients (relative to that teacher￿s π).  
This leaves 1,184 linearly independent coefficients for each grade.       
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score as well as all lagged teachers as explanatory variables.  This takes a different form.  Suppose 
that the causal model for grade-g achievement is:
 33 
(22)  Aig = Ti1 β1
g + ￿ + Tig βg
g + Aig-1 χ + μi + ηig. 
Differencing from this the corresponding equation for the g-1 score, we get 
(23)  ∆Aig = Ti1 (β1
g ￿ β1
g-1) + ￿ + Tig-1 (βg-1
g ￿ βg-1
g-1) + Tig βg
g + ∆Aig-1 χ + ∆ηig. 
This eliminates the ability term μi, but even with strict exogeneity of teacher assignments the lagged 
gain score ∆Aig-1 is endogenous to ∆ηig.  Aig-2 will serve as an instrument (Anderson and Hsiao, 1981, 
1982).  Strict exogeneity can be tested by including Tig+1 as an additional regressor in (23); if the 
assumption holds, the coefficients on future teachers should be zero.  The last row of Table 9 
presents the test of this restriction (using g=5).  It is rejected decisively. 
VI.  Teacher Characteristics 
Many value added studies contrast the large apparent effects of teachers indicated by VAMs 
like those discussed here with the small estimated effects of teachers￿ observed characteristics.  The 
latter derive from simple regression specifications that replace teacher indicators with observed 
teacher characteristics.  In light of the results thus far, it is reasonable to ask whether this sort of 
specification can identify the causal effects of teacher characteristics on student gains.  I again 
investigate this by asking whether future teachers￿ characteristics predict current gains. 
Table 10 presents the results.  I focus on a short vector of teacher characteristics:  An 
indicator for whether the teacher has a master￿s degree, a linear experience measure, an indicator for 
whether the teacher has less than two years of experience, and the teacher￿s score on the Praxis tests 
                                                 
33 As discussed in Section IIC, including the lagged score adds no generality so long as the specification allows a flexible 
decay structure for the effects of lagged inputs.  However, as many authors focus on models with lagged test scores, this 
is presented for completeness.      
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required to obtain certification in North Carolina.
34  My sample consists of students with complete 
records in grades 3-6 who attended the same school in grades 4 and 5 and had valid teacher matches 
in grades 3-5.  I further discard students for whom I am unable to assemble complete characteristics 
for each of the teachers in grades 3-6, as well as those attending schools where fewer than 10 
students meet the other criteria.   
Columns 1 and 3 present basic estimates of the effects of 4
th and 5
th grade teachers on 4
th 
and 5
th grade gain scores, respectively.  Each specification includes school fixed effects and in each 
case standard errors are clustered on the school.
35  Results echo those in the literature:  A master￿s 
degree appears to make little difference, but teacher experience has an effect on student test scores 
(e.g., Clotfelter, et al., 2006, 2007; Goldhaber and Brewer, 1997; Hanushek and Rivkin, 2006).   
Columns 2 and 4 generalize these specifications by adding controls for past and future 
teachers￿ characteristics.  Several characteristics of past and future teachers have significant effects, 
and there is no indication that current teachers￿ characteristics are better predictors than are those of 
past and future teachers.  The bottom rows of the table present hypothesis tests on several 
combinations of the coefficients.  I cannot reject zero effects of 3
rd grade teachers￿ characteristics on 
4
th grade gains, but the other tests indicate that the effects of past and future teachers￿ characteristics 
are significantly different from zero (at the 10 percent level).   
Column 5 reports the sum of teachers￿ effects on grade-4 and grade-5 gains, as well as 
composite tests.  None of the teacher characteristics have significant effects on cumulative gains.  I 
reject the hypotheses that past teachers￿ effects are zero for both 4
th and 5
th grade gains (that is, 
                                                 
34 I use the tests required for elementary certification for teachers in grades 3 through 5.  For grade 6 teachers, I use 
middle-school-certification tests if they are available, or all available tests if not.  Each test is standardized among North 
Carolina teachers who took them in the same year, then scores are averaged across tests (when multiple scores are used) 
35 This clustering is made possible by the shift from teacher fixed effects to a limited number of teacher characteristics 
(Kezdi, 2004).  The clustered standard errors are robust to classroom-level error components.  As it happens, clustering 
makes little difference to the results, suggesting that the earlier results were not much biased by the failure to allow for 
classroom-level errors in inference.     
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grade-3 teachers in column 2 and grade-3 and -4 teachers in column 4); that future teachers￿ effects 
are zero; and that all past and future teachers￿ effects are zero.  I also test and (marginally) reject the 
hypothesis that the effects of grade-6 teachers￿ characteristics on grade-5 gains are a constant 
multiple of those on grade-4 gains, as in the correlated random effects model.  The dynamic tracking 
found earlier evidently applies to teacher characteristics as well.  
VII.  Toward Identification 
I have established thus far that teachers have apparent ￿effects￿ on students￿ prior 
achievement, and that these effects are both highly statistically significant and approximately as 
important as those on current gain scores.  It is apparent that students are not even approximately 
randomly assigned to teachers.  I have also investigated and rejected a leading explanation for this 
result, that students are sorted across teachers on the basis of a permanent component of 
achievement but that assignments are random conditional on this.  Rather, it seems that teacher 
assignments respond dynamically to transitory shocks to student achievement. 
Traditional VAMs do not identify teachers￿ causal effects in the presence of dynamic 
tracking.  Non-experimental identification will require richer models that explicitly account for this 
tracking.  In this Section, I describe two models that may permit identification, under differing 
assumptions about the information used in teacher assignments.  Each model requires richer data 
than are available.  I present approximations to each that are feasible given the available data.  These 
cannot be treated as causal.  They nevertheless suggest factors that should be the focus of future 
work, and offer an indication of the degree of bias in estimates based on the VAMs in common use. 
Both of my models assume that the underlying rate of learning is homogenous across 
students (i.e. that τ
g is constant across g in equation (2)).  The negligible student-level correlation 
between grade-4 and grade-6 gains suggests that this is plausible.       
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The models differ in their treatment of the source of the relationship between the transitory 
error, ε, and teacher assignments.  The first model makes three assumptions:  (i) there is no decay in 
the effect of non-teacher inputs, so the error term in equation (4) is simply εig φg
g; (ii) this error is 
composed of a signal component and a noise component, εig = εig
* + eig, and the signal component is 
serially uncorrelated; (iii) teacher assignments depend in part on past realizations of the signal, εi1
*, 
￿, εig-1
*, but not, conditional on this, on the noise component.  Assumption (ii) attributes all serial 
correlation in observed gains to measurement error in the annual tests.
36  (iii) might hold if the test 
scores themselves were unavailable for use in tracking.
  
Under assumptions (i) through (iii), the non-random assignment of students to teachers can 
account for the correlation between gain scores and future teacher assignments that was seen earlier, 
but is ignorable for the effects of current and previous teachers.  Causal effects can be identified 
from simple regressions of grade-g gains on teacher assignments in grades 1 through g.   
Table 11 presents a comparison between estimates based on this model and the basic VAM, 
(14), for the effects of 4
th grade teachers.  The important distinction between the two ￿ assuming 
that assumptions (i) through (iii) are satisfied ￿ is the need to estimate lagged effects.  If indeed 
inputs decay, the net effect of the 4
th grade teacher is not simply the effect on 4
th grade gains, β4
4, but 
the cumulative effect on gains in all grades from 4 onward, β4
4 + β4
5 + ￿ + β4
G.  The available data 
do not permit the model to be extended beyond grade 5.  I therefore truncate this series after two 
terms, focusing on β4
4 + β4
5.  Similarly, one should ideally control for all previous teachers; I control 
only for those in grade 3 and afterward. 
Column 1 of Table 11 presents the basic VAM, relating grade-4 gains to grade-4 teachers.  
Column 2 presents an augmented VAM with controls for 3
rd grade teachers.  Their effects are 
                                                 
36 This is inconsistent with the calculations in Section IIIA, which indicated that corr(εi4*, εi5*) ≈ -0.25.  But these were 
based on a known reliability of 0.86.  If the test￿s reliability is in fact a bit lower, assumption (ii) could hold.  The 
published reliability is based on a sample of only 70 students (Sanford, 1996), so should not be taken as precise.     
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approximately as large as those of 4
th grade teachers.  Column 3 presents the corresponding model 
for grade-5 gains, with controls for teachers in grades 3-5.  Both 3
rd and 4
th grade teachers continue 
to have important effects in 5
th grade.  Column 4 presents teachers￿ cumulative effects, βh
4 + βh
5.  
For grade 4 teachers, these are slightly smaller than the contemporaneous effects.  The explanation is 
in the lower portion of the table, showing the correlation between the Ti4 effects from the various 
specifications.  The estimates from the basic VAM (column 1) are almost perfectly correlated with 
those from the augmented model for grade-4 gains (column 2), indicating that omitted variables bias 
in the former is trivial.  But effects on grade-5 gains are strongly negatively correlated with those on 
grade-4 gains.  Thus, the correlation between contemporaneous and cumulative (over two grades) 
effects is only about 0.5. 
My second proposed model is more realistic for the North Carolina data, where test scores 
appear to be available for use in teacher assignments.  It replaces assumptions (i) - (iii) with a single 
assumption:  E[εig | Ti1, ￿, Tig, εi1, ￿, εig-1] = E[εig | εi1, ￿, εig-1].  This would be appropriate if 
lagged test scores were the only information used in forming teacher assignments; if so, all of the 
information about future errors that is encoded in the teacher assignment sequence is also available 
from the error history.
37  Thus, the endogeneity of teacher assignments can be absorbed via controls 
for the full history of ε.  Alternatively, one can include controls for all lags of A and T (though in 
this case the lagged T coefficients are not directly interpretable as estimates of βh
g, which must be 
solved for recursively).   
Table 12 presents a comparison between this model and the basic VAM for estimation of 
the contemporaneous effect of 5
th grade teachers on 5
th grade gains.  Column 1 presents the basic 
VAM.  Column 2 presents a specification that is augmented with controls for teachers in grades 3 
                                                 
37 This implies that Ti1 is randomly assigned, as there is no prior achievement history on which it can be based.  This 
initial condition is required for the identification of lagged effects.  Without it, only contemporaneous effects ￿ the βgg 
parameters in (4), for g>1 ￿ are identified.     
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and 4 (as in column 3 of Table 11).
38  Column 3 further adds controls for the full available history of 
test scores.  Three scores are available:  The end-of-grade tests in grades 3 and 4, plus a pre-test 
given at the beginning of grade 3.  All three are highly significantly related to the grade-5 gain.
39  
Their inclusion changes the estimated grade-5 teacher effects:  The correlation of the β5
5 coefficients 
from the augmented specification and those from the VAM with lagged teachers but no 
achievement history controls is only 0.82.  
Neither of these models is perfectly realistic for North Carolina, where test scores might be 
used in teacher assignments but where ￿ not least because there are no end-of-grade tests before 3
rd 
grade ￿ they are unlikely to be the only information used.  However, the analyses in Tables 11 and 
12 suggest that both heterogeneous rates of decay and the non-random assignment of students to 
teachers are important factors, and that simple VAMs which fail to account for them are not likely 
to be very informative about teachers￿ true value added. 
VIII.  Discussion 
In the absence of random assignment, researchers often assume without evidence that the 
inclusion of large numbers of fixed effects will permit unbiased estimation of causal effects.  My 
analysis indicates, at least in the case of teachers, that this assumption is unwarranted.  Teachers are 
not as good as randomly assigned.   
The results presented here invalidate many of the strategies that have been used to estimate 
teachers￿ effects.  In particular, there is no basis for the continued inclusion of student fixed effects 
in value added models, as the assumptions that are required for this are clearly falsified by the data.  
It remains possible that the assumptions needed for identification without student fixed effects are 
                                                 
38 This is an identical specification to that in column 3 of Table 11.  The samples differ somewhat, as the sample used in 
Table 12 conditions on a complete test score history. 
39 The significance of the grade-3 scores indicates that assumption (ii) of the first model must be incorrect, as 
measurement error in grade-5 gains should be uncorrelated with grade-3 scores.       
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satisfied, though even here there must be changes in the methods used:  There is clear evidence for 
heterogeneity in teachers￿ lagged effects on achievement gains in later grades, and a teacher￿s short-
run effect appears to be a poor proxy for her cumulative effect.   
It must also be emphasized that even when value added models incorporate sufficient 
flexibility to capture lagged effects, they rely on strong, unverified assumptions about the teacher 
assignment process.  The VAMs in common use depend on incorrect assumptions, and richer 
models that are not falsified by the data yield notably different estimates of teachers￿ effects.  Causal 
inference from observational data on student tests and teacher assignments calls for a great deal of 
caution and more attention to the plausibility of the identifying assumptions.   
Value added estimates should be validated before being pressed into service in accountability 
and compensation policy.  An obvious first step is to compare non-experimental estimates of 
individual teachers￿ effects in random assignment experiments with those based on pre- or post-
experimental data (as in Cantrell, Fullerton, et al., 2007).  But experiments are unlikely to resolve the 
issue.  Experimental samples are typically small and unrepresentative, while most value added 
applications would apply to most or all teachers.  As Figure 1 indicates, value added analyses are 
driven by a minority of schools; an experiment that excludes these schools is unlikely to resolve the 
important questions about universal value added systems.  More attention should be paid as well to 
non-experimental evaluations, both validation studies
40 and falsification exercises like this one. 
The questions investigated and methods used here have application beyond the estimation of 
teacher value added.  Within education, similar observational estimates are used to measure the 
quality of schools (Kane and Staiger, 2002; Ladd and Walsh, 2002).  Outside of education, models of 
firm and industry wage effects that include worker fixed effects (Abowd, et al., 1999) are structurally 
                                                 
40 Jacob and Lefgren (2005) and Harris and Sass (2007) show that VAM estimates are correlated with principals￿ ratings 
of teacher performance.  More work along these lines is needed.     
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similar to the student fixed effects VAM, and rely on similar (equally implausible) assumptions.  
Evidence about the ￿effects￿ of future schools and employers on current outcomes would be 
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 Figure 1.  Distribution of p values from school-level tests of hypothesis that all teachers at 
school have identical effects. 





























Schools with >=5 teachers
Null (all schools)
Null (>=5 teachers)
 Table 1.  Across-grade correlations of reading test scores and test score gains
Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6 Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6 Cumulative
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
N 96,678 96,243 97,199 98,080  88,982 89,352 89,945  80,724 
Mean 0.00 0.34 0.98 1.15 0.34 0.63 0.17 1.13
SD 1.00 0.98 0.84 0.94 0.60 0.56 0.53 0.65
Correlations
Grade 3 1
Grade 4 0.81 1
Grade 5 0.77 0.82 1
Grade 6 0.76 0.80 0.82 1
Grade 4 -0.29 0.29 0.06 0.05 1
Grade 5 -0.24 -0.51 0.07 -0.19 -0.43 1
Grade 6 0.15 0.16 -0.11 0.47 0.01 -0.42 1




Achievement levels Gain scoresTable 2.  Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Students Schools
Total 129,665  1,316  65,582 860  21,101 457 
Count by # of 5th grade teachers represented in the sample
1 5th grade teacher 1,947  117  0 0  0 0 
2 5th grade teachers 4,240 128  8,556 202  1,527  59 
3-5 5th grade teachers 44,026 608  48,425 600  16,118 353 
>5 5th grade teachers 79,452  463  8,601 58  3,456 45 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Female 48% 50% 51%
Black 30% 28% 18%
Hispanic 5% 4% 2%
Other non-white 5% 4% 3%
Consistent student record 98% 100% 100%
Data available for 
Grade 3 78% 87% 100%
Grade 4 78% 92% 100%
Grade 5 79% 99% 100%
Grade 6 80% 93% 100%
Changed schools in
Grade 4 26% 21% 0%
Grade 5 23% 19% 0%
Grade 6 80% 95% 93%
"Valid" teacher in
Grade 3 78% 84% 86%
Grade 4 77% 87% 100%
Grade 5 73% 100% 100%
Grade 6 0% 0% 0%
Reading test score
Grade 3 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.98 0.25 0.90
Grade 4 0.34 0.98 0.39 0.97 0.59 0.89
Grade 5 0.98 0.84 1.01 0.83 1.18 0.76
Grade 6 1.15 0.94 1.19 0.92 1.38 0.86
Gain score
Grade 4 0.34 0.60 0.33 0.58 0.34 0.56
Grade 5 0.63 0.56 0.62 0.55 0.59 0.53
Grade 6 0.17 0.53 0.16 0.53 0.19 0.52
Cumulative 1.13 0.65 1.11 0.63 1.12 0.62








4th - 6th grades
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fit statistics
N 59,104 54,377 59,535 51,275
# of teachers 3,013 3,013 3,013 3,013
# of schools 860 860 860 860
R2 0.098 0.085 0.095 0.096
Adjusted R2 0.050 0.031 0.047 0.039
Just school effects: R2 0.048 0.044 0.052 0.053
Just school effects: Adj. R2 0.034 0.028 0.038 0.037
Test, teacher effects = 0
Test statistic 2,953 2,318 2,650 2,274
DF 2,153 2,153 2,153 2,153
5% critical value 2,262 2,262 2,262 2,262
p value <0.001 0.007 <0.001 0.035
Standard deviation of teacher effects
Unadjusted 0.145 0.140 0.130 0.154
Adjusted 0.103 0.081 0.085 0.087
Dependent variable
Notes:  Standard deviations of teacher effects are weighted by the number of students assigned 
to each teacher, with degrees of freedom adjustments to account for the adjustment of teacher 
effects to have mean zero at each school.  Adjusted variances are computed by subtracting the 








4th - 6th grades
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unadjusted
4th grade gain score 1 -0.41 0.04 0.56
5th grade gain score -0.41 1 -0.54 0.12
6th grade gain score 0.04 -0.54 1 0.40
Cumulative gain, 4th - 6th grades 0.56 0.12 0.40 1
Adjusted for sampling covariances
4th grade gain score 1 -0.38 0.06 0.56
5th grade gain score -0.38 1 -0.69 0.15
6th grade gain score 0.06 -0.69 1 0.28
Cumulative gain, 4th - 6th grades 0.56 0.15 0.28 1
Dependent variable
Notes:  Each correlation is computed from specifications like those in Table 3, but limited to students 
with data on both dependent variables.  Correlations are weighted by the number of such students in 
this subsample.  Sampling covariances are estimated allowing for heteroskedasticity and arbitrary 
clustering within students across grades.Unadjusted  Adjusted Unadjusted Adjusted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
3rd grade teacher 0.21 0.14 0.18 0.10
4th grade teacher 0.22 0.15 0.20 0.13
5th grade teacher 0.20 0.12 0.20 0.13
6th grade teacher 0.17 0.10 0.17 0.11
Model for 4th grade gain score Model for 5th grade gain score
Notes:  Statistics are computed from separate specifications for 4th and 5th grade gain scores, each 
including school fixed effects and fixed effects for 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th grade teachers.  Across-
teacher variances are weighted by the number of students taught.  Adjusted variances are 
computed by subtracting the weighted average of the heteroskedasticity-robust sampling variance of 
the teachers' effects.  Estimates corresponding to the contemporaneous teacher are shaded.
Table 5.  Standard deviations of teacher effects in models with controls for past and future 
teachersTable 6.  Models with controls for all past and future teachers
Model 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable is 4th grade gain score
Full model 5,799 0.33 0.082 -1.00 1.18
Restricted model
Omitting one set of teacher effects at a time
  Excluding 3rd grade teachers 4,251 0.25 1,548 2,127 0.064 -1.04 0.57
Excluding 4th grade teachers 4,496 0.26 1,303 2,014 0.056 -1.02 0.68
Excluding 5th grade teachers 4,492 0.28 1,307 1,621 0.079 -1.04 0.65
Excluding 6th grade teachers 4,615 0.28 1,184 1,441 0.084 -1.04 0.70
Omitting several teacher effects together
All teachers excluded 457 0.06 5,342 5,773 0.036 -1.16 -0.99
All but current teachers excluded 1,760 0.14 4,039 4,357 0.063 -1.13 -0.47
All past teachers excluded 4,251 0.25 1,548 2,127 0.064 -1.04 0.57
All future teachers excluded 3,308 0.22 2,491 2,822 0.081 -1.09 0.16
Dependent variable is 5th grade gain score
Full model 5,799 0.33 0.082 -1.15 1.04
Restricted model
Omitting one set of teacher effects at a time
  Excluding 3rd grade teachers 4,251 0.27 1,548 1,838 0.082 -1.20 0.41
Excluding 4th grade teachers 4,496 0.26 1,303 1,899 0.061 -1.16 0.53
Excluding 5th grade teachers 4,492 0.26 1,307 1,810 0.066 -1.17 0.52
Excluding 6th grade teachers 4,615 0.28 1,184 1,619 0.075 -1.18 0.57
Omitting several teacher effects together
All teachers excluded 457 0.05 5,342 5,886 0.034 -1.30 -1.13
All but current teachers excluded 1,764 0.13 4,035 4,567 0.052 -1.26 -0.60
All past teachers excluded 2,948 0.19 2,851 3,440 0.060 -1.22 -0.11
All future teachers excluded 4,615 0.28 1,184 1,619 0.075 -1.18 0.57
More conservative criteria Robust Wald test 
(relative to full model)
Notes:  N=21,101.  Each model includes 457 effects for the school attended in grades 3-5; 6th grade teachers 
are interacted with indicators for these schools.  The tests in columns 3-4 reject each restriction at the 0.001 
level.  Akaike (AIC) and Schwartz (BIC) statistics are presented in logs.Grade 3 teacher Grade 4 teacher Grade 5 teacher Grade 6 teacher
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unadjusted -0.37 -0.52 -0.41 -0.42
Adjusted -0.25 -0.61 -0.38 -0.40
Table 7.  Correlation between teacher effects on 4th and 5th grade gains, by teacher grade, 
full modelTable 8.  Optimal minimum distance estimates
4th grade gain 5th grade gain
(1) (2)
Unconstrained estimates
SD, unadjusted 0.21 0.21
SD, adjusted 0.12 0.14
Constrained (OMD) estimates
SD, unadjusted 0.02 0.18












6th grade teacher effect on
1,607
1,183





(1) (2) (3) (4)
1) Base model 1,607 1,183 1,264 <0.001
2) Gain in standardized scores 1,584 1,183 1,264 <0.001
3) Standardized (by base level) gain 1,659 1,183 1,264 <0.001
4) Gain in percentile scores 1,616 1,183 1,264 <0.001
5) Control for lagged score (2SLS; Wald for β6
5=0) 1,349 1,184 1,265 <0.001
Notes:  Tests in rows 1-4 are of the hypothesis that the vector of teacher effects on 4th grade gains is a 
scalar multiple of the vector of effects on 5th grade gains.  Each is computed as the objective function 
from OMD estimates, as reported (for the base model) in Table 8, and each is distributed chi2 under the 
null hypothesis.  The test in row 5 is of the hypothesis that the vector of 6th grade teacher effects on 5th 
grade gains is identically zero; it, too, is chi2 under the null.  Table 10.  Estimates of the effects of teacher characteristics on student gains
Cumulative
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
MA degree Grade 3 teacher 1.64 -1.81 -0.17
(1.31) (1.14) (1.82)
Grade 4 teacher 0.88 0.82 -0.14 0.68
(1.42) (1.41) (1.33) (1.68)
Grade 5 teacher 1.69 -1.35 -1.38 0.31
(1.27) (1.23) (1.23) (1.67)
Grade 6 teacher 2.51 -0.20 2.31
(1.16) (1.07) (1.72)
Experience Grade 3 teacher -0.12 0.00 -0.12
(0.06) (0.06) (0.09)
Grade 4 teacher 0.09 0.09 -0.02 0.07
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09)
Grade 5 teacher -0.04 0.13 0.13 0.10
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10)
Grade 6 teacher 0.01 -0.11 -0.10
(0.06) (0.05) (0.09)
Experience < 2 Grade 3 teacher 0.56 1.95 2.51
(2.14) (1.81) (3.21)
Grade 4 teacher -5.79 -5.86 6.66 0.80
(1.90) (1.90) (1.86) (2.62)
Grade 5 teacher -1.30 -0.13 -0.32 -1.62
(1.92) (1.91) (1.89) (2.88)
Grade 6 teacher -0.32 1.19 0.86
(1.73) (1.68) (3.21)
Praxis score Grade 3 teacher -0.60 0.15 -0.45
(0.74) (0.66) (1.13)
Grade 4 teacher -0.19 -0.17 -0.22 -0.39
(0.80) (0.80) (0.78) (0.96)
Grade 5 teacher -1.01 0.83 0.92 -0.09
(0.71) (0.82) (0.82) (1.10)
Grade 6 teacher -1.28 0.22 -1.06
(0.68) (0.62) (0.96)
R2 0.076 0.077 0.068 0.070
p values for restrictions Joint tests
All current teacher characteristics = 0 0.001 0.001 0.216 0.176 0.002
All prior teacher characteristics = 0 0.249 0.007 0.005
All future teacher characteristics = 0 0.087 0.062 0.033
All past and future teacher characteristics = 0 0.115 0.002 0.002
Grade-6 coefficients in (2) and (4) are proportional 0.056
Grade 4 gain*100 Grade 5 gain*100
Notes:  Sample restricted to students for whom complete teacher data is available in grades 3-6 and who 
attended the same school in grades 4 and 5.  N=16,386 from 632 schools.  All specifications include fixed 
effects for the (grade 4 and 5) school, and standard errors are clustered on the school.  Column 5 reports 
composite tests for the combined restrictions in columns 2 and 4, allowing for clustering across grades as well 
as within.  The "scalar" hypothesis is that the ratio of the grade 6 teacher coefficients in column 4 to those in 







(1) (2) (3) (4)
Standard deviation of teacher effects
Unadjusted
Grade 3 teacher 0.20 0.18 0.22
Grade 4 teacher 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.19
Grade 5 teacher 0.19 0.19
Adjusted
Grade 3 teacher 0.13 0.09 0.14
Grade 4 teacher 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.11
Grade 5 teacher 0.12 0.12
Correlation of 4th grade teacher effect across specifications
Unadjusted
(1) Sparse model 1 0.94 -0.50 0.48
(2) 4th grade effect 0.94 1 -0.52 0.52
(3) 5th grade effect -0.50 -0.52 1 0.46
(4) Cumulative effect 0.48 0.52 0.46 1
Adjusted
(1) Sparse model 1 0.9996 -0.68 0.50
(2) 4th grade effect 1.00 1 -0.67 0.51
(3) 5th grade effect -0.68 -0.67 1 0.39
(4) Cumulative effect 0.50 0.51 0.39 1
Model with lagged effects Sparse 
model for 4th 
grade gains
Notes:  Sparse model includes only school effects and effects for the current teacher.  Models in 
columns 2 and 3 add controls for the 3rd grade teacher and (in column 3) the 4th grade teacher.  
Cumulative effect is the sum of the effects in columns 2 and 3.Table 12.  Alternative specifications for 5th grade gain scores
Basic model Controls for 
lagged teachers
Controls for lagged 
teachers & scores
(1) (2) (3)
Standard deviation of teacher effects
Unadjusted
Grade 3 teacher 0.21 0.14
Grade 4 teacher 0.21 0.14
Grade 5 teacher 0.17 0.19 0.19
Adjusted
Grade 3 teacher 0.13 0.07
Grade 4 teacher 0.15 0.08
Grade 5 teacher 0.11 0.12 0.11
Coefficients on lagged scores
Grade 3 score, beginning of year 0.077
(0.006)
Grade 3 score 0.252
(0.007)
Grade 4 score -0.581
(0.007)
Correlations of grade-5 teacher effects
Unadjusted
(1) Basic model 1 0.87 0.68
(2) Lagged teachers 0.87 1 0.80
(3) Lagged teachers & scores 0.68 0.80 1
Adjusted
(1) Basic model 1 0.99 0.76
(2) Lagged teachers 0.99 1 0.82
(3) Lagged teachers & scores 0.76 0.82 1
Notes:  All teacher effects are normalized to mean zero within each school.  Basic model (column 
1) includes only effects for the current teacher.  Model in column 2 adds controls for grade-3 and 
grade-4 teachers.  Column 3 also adds controls for achievement scores at the beginning of grade 
3 and at the end of grades 3 and 4.  